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1.1  Introduction 
A central theme of recent work on trade policy for imperfectly competitive 
markets has been that by  precommitting to tariffs or subsidies, governments 
can affect firms'  strategic positions, thereby shifting profits toward domestic 
firms.' Eaton and Grossman (1986) show, however, that the form of  optimal 
trade  policies  depends critically  on the  nature  of  the competition between 
firms.*  Hence, if such models are to be used to justify activist trade policy, it is 
necessary to have information not only on demand and cost conditions, but 
also on the nature of the competition between rival firms. 
There has recently been some success in implementing these theories using 
calibration models. Dixit (1988) applies a calibrated model to US.-Japan com- 
petition in the automobile industry. He uses a conjectural variations (CV) ap- 
proach to capture firm interactions, where the conjectures result from use of 
profit maximization equations calibrated to market data. The CVs then com- 
bine with calibrated estimates of demand to determine the optimal trade and 
industrial policies. 
This work has generated excitement both in policy circles and among econo- 
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1. See Dixit (1988) for a survey of  this literature. 
2. Optimal policy, of course, depends on what other distortions exist. See Krishna and Thursby 
(1989). who look at overall optimal policies using a targeting approach. 
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mists, as policy recommendations can be made even when only minimal data is 
avai1able.l Richardson (1989), Srinivasan (1  989), and Helpman and Krugman 
( 1989) survey work in this area. Applied econometricians, however, look upon 
these models with considerable suspicion, because they appear to elicit policy 
recommendations  out of tiny data sets and often poorly known elasticity pa- 
rameters. Sensitivity analysis is typically limited to simply examining the ef- 
fects of changing the parameters used in calibration. 
In this paper, we explore the robustness of such models to changes in model 
specification itself. Since Dixit’s model (1988) is probably the most influential 
of these models to date, we examine how an alternative specification of this 
model alters the policy recommendations and welfare results of the calibration 
exercise. As does Dixit, we apply the model to US.-Japan competition in the 
automobile industry, expanding the years examined to the full range from I979 
to 1985. The specification we employ is richer than Dixit’s in that we allow 
product differentiation  not  only between  U.S. and Japanese goods, but also 
between goods made within each of the c~untries.~ 
The advantages of doing so are twofold. First, the richer specification allows 
us to get estimates for the extent of product differentiation,  as well as time- 
varying behavioral parameters for firms and consumers. Second, it allows us 
to ask which results from Dixit’s simpler model are robust and which are arti- 
facts of  the model specification. 
The effect of the richer specification is to completely reverse the sign of the 
resulting optimal trade policy: we find the optimal policy to be a subsidy to 
rather than a tax on imports. In fact, following the policies recommended by 
Dixit’s model can result in a welfare loss if the “true” model is as we specify. 
The more detailed specification also greatly affects the implicit estimates of 
collusiodcompetition between  firms. Our results  suggest that  auto industry 
firms behave  more competitively  than  Bertrand  oligopolists,  as opposed to 
Dixit’s finding of competition somewhere between that of Bertrand and Cour- 
not  oligopolists. Dixit’s result is in part a byproduct  of  his assumption  that 
firms within a nation produce a homogeneous good. With this assumption, the 
existence of any markup of price above marginal cost implies that behavior is 
more collusive than Bertrand. 
On  the other hand,  some results  are robust.  For example, the effects on 
firms’ behavior  of trade policies, particularly  the voluntary export restraints 
(VERs) imposed at the end of  198  1, correspond to the effects noted by Dixit. 
Our implicit estimates of  demand cross-elasticities  are also consistent  with 
3. Other examples of work in this area include that of  Baldwin and Krugman (1988) and Ven- 
ables and Smith (1986). 
4.  Dixit (1988), in contrast, assumes that goods produced within a country are perfect substitutes 
for one another-that  a Chevrolet is the same as a Lincoln or a Pontiac. Although our specification 
allows for imperfect substitution between all products, the separability we impose groups together 
all U.S. cars and all Japanese cars. That is, our model puts a Chevy in the same group as a Cadillac, 
and a Civic in the same group as an Acura. 13  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
other sources. In addition, the targeting of instruments to distortions evident in 
Dixit’s results seems to carry through. Finally, as is common with most cali- 
brated trade models, the extent of welfare gains from optimal policies, particu- 
larly optimal trade policies alone, remains quite limited. 
In section 1.2, we develop the model, present the data and sources, and ex- 
plain the calibration procedure. Section 1.3 contains our results. We examine 
the years from 1979 to 1985, which includes years when VERs were in force. 
Krishna  (1  989) shows that in the presence of  such restraints the behavior of 
firms is likely to become more collusive as foreign firms become effectively 
capacity-constrained. The results in Dixit (1988) are consistent with this. Dixit 
looks at the years 1979,1980. and 1983. The behavior he finds in 1983 appears 
more collusive than that in 1980. Our results in section 1.3.1 similarly indicate 
that VERs allowed Japanese firms to act more collusively from 1981 to 1983. 
After 1983, however, we find that both U.S. and Japanese firms acted less com- 
petitively than prior to the VERs. 
In section 1.3.2 we derive the welfare function, which we then maximize to 
obtain the optimal tariff and production subsidy. As in Dixit (1988), we esti- 
mate optimal polices both with and without monopoly (union) labor rents. We 
then compare our results to Dixit’s. Dixit finds that the optimal policy consists 
of  a tariff on imports and a subsidy to domestic production. In contrast, our 
model indicates a subsidy to both imports and domestic production to be opti- 
mal. We  suspect that this is related  to our demand  specification, which in- 
creases the importance of  consumer surplus in welfare, thereby increasing the 
attractiveness of import subsidies which raise consumption. In addition, com- 
petition  in our model appears to be quite vigorou~.~  This tends to limit the 
gains from using the optimal production subsidy, as these gains are largest in 
the face of less competitive behavior. As does Dixit, we find that the existence 
of  labor rents raises the optimal subsidy to production  and reduces,  and in 
some cases reverses, the optimal import subsidy. 
The final section offers some concluding comments and directions for future 
research. Our work indicates that there is good reason to be suspicious of the 
results of  such simple calibration exercises. Indeed, policymakers should be 
extremely cautious in the application of “optimal” trade policies suggested by 
calibrated models, as the nature of the recommended policies may simply be an 
artifact of the model specification and calibration procedure. Since the optimal 
policy resulting from one model can differ dramatically from that of  another 
model, and since use of the “wrong” policies can actually reduce welfare, it is 
important to specify a flexible form which does not dictate the direction of the 
results. Even if the optimal policies are found and implemented, the gains from 
5. The direction of optimal trade policy is known to he related to the extent of  competition, as 
parametrized by the choice of  the  strategic variable and thus in our model by the CVs. For ex- 
ample, in Eaton and Grossman’s (1986) simple model of  duopolistic competition in third party 
markets, a tax on exports turns out to be optimal with price competition, while a subsidy is optimal 
with quantity competition. 14  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
doing so are relatively  limited, even without foreign retaliation. This result, 
that only fairly small welfare gains are to be had from optimal tariffs and sub- 
sidies, seems common to many such models. 
Calibration models should thus probably not be used to determine trade and 
industrial policy without detailed empirical work to guide the model selection. 
Sufficiently  well  specified,  however, they prove to be a valuable  tool in the 
analysis of  imperfectly competitive industries, since many important results 
are not sensitive to model specification. Guidance from careful empirical work 
as to the correct demand and cost parametrizations to use in such calibration 
models is vital for them to serve as useful guides to determine trade policy. 
1.2  A Model with Product Differentiation 
We extend Dixit (1988)  by allowing for product differentiation among home 
and foreign firms, as opposed to Dixit’s assumption that all firms in a country 
produce the same good. This is important, since Dixit’s results, which suggest 
that behavior lies between Cournot and Bertrand, could be a result of this as- 
sumption. With homogeneous  goods and many firms, any markup over cost 
implies behavior more collusive than that of Bertrand oligopolists. The richer 
specification allows changes in the parametrization  to affect not only the mag- 
nitude of the optimal tariff, but also the sign. In contrast, Dixit’s parametriza- 
tion restricts tariffs and subsidies to be positive.6 
1.2.1  The Model 
Demand raises from an aggregate consumer who receives  all profits and 
tariff revenues and maximizes a utility function of the form: 
u =  11,  + U(S), 
where n, is a numeraire good, and U(S)  is the subutility function, 
U(S)  = ps., 
with 
This form allows p to parametrize the extent of product differentiation be- 
tween U.S.  goods x and Japanese goods y, while p,  and p, parametrize substitu- 
tion within home goods and within foreign goods,’re~pectively.~ 
6. In Dixit’s model, welfare increases with a subsidy or a tariff from an initial position of  zero 
tariffs and subsidies. With a well-behaved welfare function this implies that the optimal tariff and 
subsidy is positive. 
7. Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse (1989) show that these CES demands can arise from the 
aggregation of consumers with Lancasterian preferences over characteristics. The key restriction 
needed is that the number of characteristics exceeds the number of varieties (models) minus one. 15  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
To best understand the form of the demand functions, think of this subutility 
function as a particular separable form, and think of p as a scale parameter. To 
derive the demand functions for the goods, think of S as the level of services 
produced by all new cars purchased, both domestic and foreign. 
Consumers purchase U.S. cars xi from each of  the n domestic firms and 
Japanese cars y'  from the m foreign firms. The goods of the individual firms 
are then used to make the aggregate goods X and Z These X and Y in turn make 
the services S from which consumers derive utility. Since consumers produce 
the  services using  a household production  function, the price of  a service 
equals its marginal cost. Firms' market power, of course, creates a wedge be- 
tween the price and marginal cost of  the products from which the services 
are produced. 
The actual forms of these functions can be obtained from the CES parame- 
trization. Equating the marginal utility of S with its marginal cost C and in- 
verting gives the demand for services: 
The production functions for X  and Y give rise to the associated cost func- 
tions: 
I /rx 
p(v', . . . ,  v") = c  (  'x  L:'  v, I 
and 
where v denotes U.S. price, w Japanese price, and rx =  px/(p,-  1) and ry =  p,/ 
These cost functions can then be differentiated to obtain the unit input re- 
quirements for the output of individual firms in the aggregate goods X  and I: 
while the cost function for services, C(p(.),q(.)),  can be differentiated to obtain 
the input requirements of X and Y in services S,  which we denote as a and a*. 
To calibrate the model, assume that firms within each country are symmet- 
ric, and then use the CES structure to obtain the demands for individual U.S. 
and Japanese firms' goods, xi(.)  and y'(.): 
(Py-  1). 
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Note that XI(.)  and y'(.) thus depend on the variables n, m, v, w, r;  rx,  r,, (Y, 
and p, where n and m, the number of domestic and foreign firms, and v and w, 
domestic and foreign prices, are taken from the data. From the cost function 
for services, C, r =  p/(p -  1). 
Summing these demands over the n domestic firms and m foreign firms gives 
the demands for US. and Japanese autos. Since we assume that both markets 
clear, these demands are observable as actual sales, which we denote as Q, for 
U.S. cars and Q,  for Japanese cars: 
Before we derive the remaining equations for the calibration, recall that the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods equals 
which is defined so as to be positive. The analogous g  and ub  parametrize the 
degree of substitutability between goods produced by two firms of  the same 
nationality, with 
ur = 1 -  rT, 
and 
uy  = 1 -  r,. 
The demand elasticity for the aggregate good, r,  defined so as to be posi- 
tive, equals 
We  next use a number of relationships  implied  by the CES structures to 
derive price elasticities of  demand. We then use these elasticities, along with 
the demand functions  for each good, to derive expressions  for firms'  profit 
maximizing conditions. 
Differentiating XI(.)  gives domestic elasticities of demand: 
l++ 1  ' 
l-r+r+ 
(1 -  r,)(n - 1) + 
and 
8. Krishna, Hogan, and Swagel (1989) contains a fuller derivation of these elasticities 17  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
l++  1  ' 
l-r+&@ 
where 
Similarly, differentiating y'(.) gives foreign elasticities of demand: 
and 
Note that &q((a,b)  is the elasticity of  demand for the ith good in country a 
with respect to the price of  thejth good in country  b. For example, E"(x,x) 
denotes domestic firms' own elasticity of demand, while ~u((y,y)  represents for- 
eign firms'  cross-elasticity  of  demand  when both  i and j are foreign goods. 
Similarly, cross-elasticities  of  demand between the goods of  different coun- 
tries equal 
and 
We are now ready to use firms'  first-order conditions for profit maximiza- 
tion. The profits of a typical U.S. firm are 
Ti =  (v' -  d + s)x'(v',  . . . ,  v",  w', . . . ,  W). 
where s is the specific subsidy to home firms and d is the (constant) domestic 
marginal cost of production. 
This yields the first-order condition for a U.S. firm: 
E"(x,x) -  y = v'/(v' -  d + s),  (3) 
with the cv, 
V 
W 
y = (n -  I)EU(x,x)Y" + msu(x,y)- y'*, 
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Similarly, the first-order condition for a Japanese firm is: 
(4)  E"(Y,Y) -  y* = w'/(w' -  d* -  t). 
where t is the specific tariff on the foreign firm and d* is the (constant) foreign 
marginal cost of production. The foreign cv is thus 
where 
We now have four equations, but seven unknowns: y, y*,  a,  p, r,  rx,  and rj, 
There are many possible ways to complete the calibration; available elasticity 
estimates typically determine the route chosen. Since Dixit cites several esti- 
mates for E, the total elasticity of demand for all automobiles, and u, the elas- 
ticity of  substitution between U.S. and Japanese cars, we employ these in the 
calibration. Following Dixit, we take 2.0 as the base case for u and perform 
sensitivity analysis using values of  1.5 and 3.0. For  E, Dixit's figure of  1.0 
would imply a  = 0. We therefore use 1.1 as our central case and perform sen- 
sitivity analysis for values of  1.05, 1.30, and 1.50.9  Table 1.9 contains the re- 
sults of this sensitivity analysis, which we describe in section 1.3.4. For US. 
and Japanese cars to be substitutes, e.g., ~Q(x,y)  > 0, E must be less than u, so 
we report no results for the case where both E and u equal 1  SO. 
Given data for v, w,  n, m,  Q,, and Q,  and estimates for E and u, the demand 
equations (1) and (2) become a system of  two equations with the three un- 
knowns p, ux,  and uy.  We  solve the system recursively. Dividing (1) by  (2) 
eliminates p. Taking a value for uy  as given then gives ux.  Substituting ax  into 
(1) or uv  into (2)  gives p. 
Since Japanese cars are probably closer substitutes for one another than they 
are for U.S. cars, uy  should be larger than u. We take uy  as 3.0 for our central 
case; this is larger than the central case estimate for u of 2.10.1° As described 
in section 1.3.4, table 1.10 shows the effects of changing uy  on firms' implied 
9. Further evidence is provided by  De Melo and Tarr  (1990). who take the price elasticity of 
10. While this value for uv  might seem arbitrary, the choice of  uv  does not at  all affect the 
demand to be  1.1 for U.S.  cars and 1.2 for foreign cars. 
resulting prices, welfare, or optimal policies. A proof of this is available from the authors. 19  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
conduct. In general, a larger cry implies that Japanese firms act more collu- 
sively, since they persist in charging a price above marginal cost even as their 
products become less distinguishable. The effect on the implied conduct of 
U.S. firms is small. 
Given (T,  and cry,  we can calculate + as (p/q)'.  Another way to get + would 
be to use the result of Krishna and Itoh (1988) that 8 = +/( 1 + +), where 8 is 
domestic producers'  share in expenditure, which equals ap/C. Thus, using the 
data described below to find 0 determines the value of +. The calibration pro- 
cedure ensures that both methods produce the same +. Once we know +, r,  E, 
rr,  and rv,  the first-order conditions (3) and (4) provide y  and y*. 
These aggregate CVs can in turn be decomposed into the component 7% 
using the definitions of y  and y*  given above. Since there are four yus and only 
two equations that define them, we must set either yLi  = yl* and y2' = yZ2,  or 
set y" = y2*  and y'* = y*I. The first set of restrictions implies that firms have 
the same conjectures about both domestic competitors and foreign firms. As 
demonstrated in Krishna (1989), this is not a good idea for years with VERs. 
The second set of restrictions implies that domestic firms'  conjectures about 
other domestic firms is the same as the foreign firms' conjectures about other 
foreign firms and, similarly, that each nation's  firms hold identical conjectures 
about firms in the other nation. U.S. and Japanese firms are thus required to 
behave similarly, which again may not be true. Since neither set of restrictions 
is particularly appealing, we simply use the aggregate CVs y  and y*  in our 
simulations." 
1.2.2  Data 
Table 1.1  contains our data. Prices and quantities for both U.S. and Japanese 
cars are taken from the Automotive News Market Data Book (ANMDB).  Prices 
are calculated as a weighted average of the suggested retail prices for March 
or April of each year, exclusive of optional equipment and domestic transport 
costs, with expenditure shares as the weights. Japanese prices include import 
duties and freight (transport) charges. Quantities are the total sales of all mod- 
els; though for U.S. cars this differs slightly from Dixit's use of production 
minus exports plus imports from Canada, the difference is far less than 1 per- 
cent for the three years of  Dixit's data. For Japanese cars, the difference be- 
tween Dixit's use of imports and our use of sales amounts to nearly 10 percent 
in 1983, the difference being reflected in changes in inventory stocks. To facili- 
tate comparisons, we use Dixit's numbers for 1979, 1980, and 1983;12 either 
way, our results change only slightly. 
As always, cost data is more difficult to obtain. As Dixit notes, true marginal 
costs should  take into account  the  shadow price  of  investment. Following 
11.  Simulations using the disaggregated CVs can be found in  Krishna, Hogan,  and Swage1 
12. Japanese sales were 1,833,744 in 1979, 1,977,018 in 1980, and 1,911,318 in 1983. 
(1989). 20  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
Table 1.1  Data 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Autos (million)  Q, 
Price ($)  V 
n’ 
cost ($)  d 
d* 
Firms  n 
m 
Labor rent 
Total elasticity of demand 
Elasticities of substitution 
Q2 
8.34  I 
1.546 







6.581  6.206 
1.819  1.892 
6,407  6,740 
4,130  4,580 
6,100  6,362 
3,800  3,963 
2.077  2.100 
4.034  4.210 
1,200  1,272 
E  = 1.1 
u  = 2.0 





































Dixit, however, we  ignore this complicated intertemporal issue and include 
only labor and materials costs in our data. The costs in table 1.1 should thus 
be seen as a lower bound on actual marginal costs. We use Dixit’s cost figures 
for  1979, 1980, and 1983 and adjust these figures for other years, following 
the method described by Dixit. For domestic autos, production costs are bro- 
ken into labor and componentlmaterials costs. Labor costs are adjusted in each 
year by -Bureau  of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures for automobile industry com- 
pensation rate changes and then by  an additional 2 percent for productivity 
changes. Componentlmaterials costs are adjusted by the wholesale price index 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS).  For Japanese costs, we 
use the IFS manufacturing wages index to adjust Dixit’s figures for materials 
costs, the IFS wagelprice index for labor costs, IFS statistics for exchange rate 
changes, and data from the World Bank Commodity Trade and Price Trends to 
adjust for changes in ocean freight costs. 
We use market share data in the ANMDB to calculate Herfindahl numbers- 
equivalents on a firm  basis, which we denote as n for the United States and m 
for Japan.I3 
1.3  Implementing the Model 
We use the data in  table  1.1 to calibrate the model for the years  1979 to 
1985. The resulting parameter values for market (consumer) and firm behavior 
are summarized in tables 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. 
13. Note  that  since we  assume product  differentiation within  each  country,  the Herfindahl 
numbers-equivalent-the  number of symmetric firms that  would reproduce the existing market 
shares-is  not really the proper measure, as the number of firms n and m are not truly exogenous. 
Our use of the Herfindahl  index should thus be taken as an approximation. While it is a simple 
matter to add two equations to endogenize n and m, the computational burden becomes much 
greater. 21  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
1.3.1  Calibration Results 
Table 1.2  summarizes the parameters which describe market (consumer) be- 
havior. For a, = 3.0, the value of a, is remarkably constant and lies around 1.3 
for all years. That the elasticity of substitution between U.S. goods is always 
smaller than that for Japanese goods suggests that U.S. autos are less inter- 
changable than Japanese autos. This seems plausible as U.S. cars seem more 
differentiated from one another than are Japanese cars. 
This is reflected in the elasticities of demand. That E"(x,x)  and E"(x,x)  are 
respectively smaller than E"( y,y)  and ~'J(y,y)  shows that demand for Japanese 
cars with respect to other Japanese cars is more price elastic than demand for 
U.S.  cars with respect to other U.S. cars. Indeed, the demand for Japanese cars 
in general reacts more to price changes, by both national and international 
competitors. That E"( y,x)  is an order of magnitude larger than E"(x,~)  illustrates 
this. The two "own"  elasticities E"(x,x) and ~"(y,y)  are orders of  magnitude 
larger than the E"'S because they reflect the effect on a firm which raises its 
own price and thus loses demand to all other firms. The four EIJ'S,  on the other 
hand, are smaller because they measure the gain of only one of the many firms 
which benefit when another firm changes its price. 
Table 1.2  Market Behavior 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
p"  10.574  9.813  10.150 
ax  1.255  1.255  1.277 
Elasticities of  demand 
E"(X,X)  1.231  1.246  1.266 
E"(X,X)  0.025  0.009  0.011 
E"CYY)  2.728  2.7 18  2.726 
E"bJ)  0.272  0.282  0.274 
E"X,Y)  0.025  0.034  0.037 
E"(j,X)  0.356  0.368  0.355 
Cross-elasticities of  demand 
Lf Q,,  v)  1.200  1.236  1.254 
L(Q,,W)  0.100  0.136  0.154 
L(Q,w)  1.900  1.864  1.846 
L(Q2,v)  0.800  0.764  0.746 
Calibration using Levinsohnk cross-elasticities 
E"(X,X)  1.219  1.226  1.238 
E'(X,X)  -0.022  -0.019  -0.009 
E"(Y,Y)  2.662  2.662  2.676 
E",Y)  0.338  0.338  0.324 
E%Y)  0.014  0.021  0.024 
E"6'J)  0.197  0.228  0.234 
L(Q,,w)  0.055  0.084  0.102 
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As a further check on these demand elasticities, we calculate the resulting 
aggregate cross-elasticities of demand and compare them to estimates in Lev- 
insohn (  1988).j4  The U.S.-U.S.  cross-elasticity, which we denote as L(Q,,v),  is 
the percentage quantity change in U.S. auto sales given an equiproportionate 
change in the price of all U.S.  cars. Similarly, we denote the U.S.-Japan cross- 
elasticity-the  response of U.S. sales to an equiproportionate change in Japa- 
nese prices-as  L(Q,,w).  The Japan-Japan and Japan-U.S. cross-elasticities are 
L(Q,,w) and L(Q,,v), respectively. As usual, we define these elasticities so that 
they are typically positive. 
For our specification, 
1-r-E 
' wm)l"  nx =  l++' 
dnx(v1, *  . . ,  V",  WI, . . . 
aw  UQ,,  w)  = [ 
Table  1.2  contains  the aggregate  cross-elasticities  which result  from  our 
model, along with the .&.-the  individual firm elasticities  of  demand. Our 
results of  1.200-1.263 for L(Q,,v)  correspond well with Levinsohn's estimates 
of 0.967-1.412.  For L(Q,,w),  our results of 0.100-0.162  are similarly roughly 
in line with Levinsohn's estimates of 0.086-0.226.  Note that after 1979, U.S. 
firms become markedly more responsive to changes in Japanese prices; 1979 is 
the year in which U.S. auto manufacturers first appealed for import protection. 
However, our results of 1.838-1.900 for L(Q,,w) differ significantly from Lev- 
insohn's estimates of 1.080-1.636, while our results of 0.738-0.800  for L(Q,,v) 
differ from Levinsohn's figures of 0.122-0.23 1. 
An alternative approach to the calibration sheds light on the implications of 
these differences. Since 4 can be calculated from market-share data, assuming 
values for the own-country cross-elasticities L(Q,,v)  and L(Q,,w) lets us solve 
for E and v.  The rest of the calibration then proceeds as before. The bottom of 
table 1.2 shows the behavioral parameters and jointly optimal policies and wel- 
fare which result from setting L(Q,,v) = 1.247 and L(Q,,w) = 1.636, which 
are the Levinsohn estimates with the smallest standard errors. Except in 1982 
and 1983, E"(x,x) is negative, indicating that U.S.  cars are complements for one 
14. Levinsohn's estimates come from an econometric study using a panel of data for 100 differ- 
ent models over the years 1983-85.  He presents four different estimates for each of the cross- 
elasticities, which he  takes  as constant over the years examined. See Levinsohn (1988, tables 
2.4-2.7). 23  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
~~~  ~~~ 
Table 1.3  Firm Behavior 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Conjectural variations 
y  -9.57  -19.62 
y*  -5.27  -15.24 
yc  0.0410  0.0510 
y5  0.2064  0.2287 
US.  prices 
V  5.95 1  6,407 
vB  23,895  25,257 
vc  26,553  28,434 
Japan prices 
W  4,000  4,130 
wB  5,567  6,220 
wc  5,857  6,591 
us.  costs 
d  5,400  6,100 
dll  1,115  1,265 
d,  1,032  1,147 
Japan costs 
d*  3,400  3,800 
dz  2,433  2,5 11 
d*,  2,357  2,419 
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another, rather than substitutes. While the optimal policies and welfare do not 
change by much, this improbable result makes us wary of Levinsohn’s estimate 
for UQ,,w). 
Table 1.2 also summarizes the value of  @,  which gives an indication of the 
strength of demand. While demand for autos was relatively strong in  1979, it 
weakened in i980, a year in which the three major U.S. producers all suffered 
losses.‘s This is picked up by the fall in p between these years. The rise in  p 
in  1983 coincides with the comeback of U.S. firms, as Ford and General Mo- 
tors edged back into profitability after the dismal years (for U.S. firms) of 
Table 1.3 summarizes the parameters which describe firm behavior. The esti- 
mates of  y and y*, parametrize the degree of  competition among U.S. and 
Japanese firms,  respectively. A zero value for y indicates Bertrand competition. 
The estimates derived are uniformly negative, suggesting that firms’ behavior 
is more competitive than that of Bertrand oligopolists. This contrasts with Dix- 
it’s  result that competition  lies somewhere between  Coumot and Bertrand. 
With Dixit’s assumption of perfect substitutability between all home goods and 
between all foreign goods, any markup of price over cost implies conduct less 
competitive  than  Bertrand.  By  introducing  product  differentiation  within 
1980-82. 
15. Halberstam (1986) provides a fascinating history of the US.  and Japanese automobile indus- 
tries. 24  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
goods made at home and within those made abroad, we do not implicitly re- 
strict the calibrated conjectures in this way. 
From 1979 to 1980, these conjectures become more negative, suggesting a 
greater degree of competition in 1980 than in 1979. This is not surprising, as 
demand was relatively  slack in  1980. With VERs in place starting in  1981, 
Japanese firms appear to behave less competitively, while U.S. firms continue 
to act in a relatively competitive manner. This is consistent with Dixit's result 
that collusion between U.S. firms does not appear to be greatly strengthened 
by  VERs. By  1984, however, U.S. firms appear to match Japanese firms in 
acting less competitively, though both continue to behave more competitively 
than Bertrand duopolists. The need to catch up to Japanese competitors appar- 
ently prodded U.S. firms into a period  of  competitive behavior, after which 
they reverted to relatively collusive behavior. 
In order to better interpret the meaning of  the values of the CVs y and y* 
we also calculate the prices of U.S. and Japanese autos that would exist were 
behavior Bertrand or Cournot. The Bertrand-equivalent prices  are calculated 
by solving for v and w in (3) and (4), with y and y* fixed at zero, and substitut- 
ing for E~(x,x)  and e"(y,y). These are given by vB  and wB  in table 1.3. 
To calculate the Coumot-equivalent prices, we solve (3) and (4) in conjunc- 
tion with equations (5)-(8) given below, which restrict firms'  beliefs (y"'s) to 
competition in quantities. The Cournot-equivalent prices v,  and w, and aggre- 
gate CVs yc  and yF are presented in table 1.3. 
For a U.S.  firm to assume that other U.S. firms do not vary their output, it 
must assume that prices change so that 
V 
W  (5)  &'J(X,  X)(l  + (n -  2)y") -  &"(X,  x)y"  + rn&"(X, y)yv"-  =  0. 
For a US.  firm to assume that Japanese firms do not change their output, it 
must assume that 
Similarly, for a Japanese firm to assume that other Japanese firms do not 
change their output as it varies its own price, it must assume that 
W 
V  (7)  E"y,  y)(l + (rn -  2)y*?) -  Eyy, y)y2* + nsqy, x)y*I-  = 0. 
For a Japanese firm to assume that U.S. firms do not vary their output, it 
must assume that 
W 
V  (8)  E"(x, y)(l + (m -  1)~~')  + -  7"  [E"(x, x)(n - 1) -  E"(x, x)] = 0. 
For firms to behave in a Cournot fashion and for this behavior to replicate 
the market outcome, v, w,  y'l, yL2,  y2I, yZ2  must be such that equations (3)-(8) 
are satisfied simultaneously. 25  The Nonoptimality of  Optimal Trade Policies 
We similarly calculate the Bertrand- and Cournot-equivalent costs for both 
U.S. and Japanese firms. These appear at the bottom of table 1.3 as d,,  d,,  d,*, 
and d,*. We discuss these results in section 1.3.4. 
Because we find behavior to be less collusive than that of Bertrand oligopo- 
lists, the Bertrand-equivalent price for both domestic and foreign cars is higher 
than the actual price, while the Cournot-equivalent price is higher still. Note, 
however, that while the Bertrand- and Cournot-equivalent prices for U.S. firms 
are much higher than actual prices, the equivalent prices for Japanese firms are 
quite close to actual prices v and w,  which are shown in the middle of  table 
1.3. This indicates that the behavior of Japanese firms is fairly close to that of 
Bertrand (and Cournot) oligopolists, while US.  firms exhibit far more compet- 
itive behavior. 
1.3.2  Welfare 
We now calculate the optimal policies which arise from maximization of the 
welfare function. The first-order conditions (3) and (4) together define how 
domestic price, v, and foreign price, w,  adjust for a given subsidy, s, and tariff, 
t. In turn,  v  and w determine U.S. and Japanese outputs. Since v and w are 
nonlinear simultaneous functions of s and t, (3) and (4) must be solved numeri- 
cally for every s and t. The resulting v and w are then used to calculate a value 
for welfare. The jointly optimal subsidy and tariff are thus the s and t which 
maximize the welfare function. For the optimal tariff by  itself, s is set to 0, 
while for the optimal subsidy by  itself, we set t  to the most-favored-nation 
(MFN) level of $100. 
As explained in section 1.2.1, we assume a numeraire good, no,  and a utility- 
maximizing aggregate consumer. We assume that all revenues are given back 
to this aggregate consumer, so that welfare is given by 
W(s,  t) = U(S(s,  t)) -  ndx(s, t) -  (w -  t)my(s,  t) 
when there are no rents to labor. Following Dixit, we assume labor rents to be 
a constant 20 percent of domestic costs in each year. For 1979, Dixit notes that 
this corresponds to about half of the wage bill. Rents are then subtracted from 
domestic cost din  the second term of the welfare function. 
1.3.3  Optimal Policies 
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 summarize the policy and welfare results for 1979-85. In 
all following tables, welfare is shown in billions of dollars. The first thing to 
notice is that in all years the jointly optimal policy is to subsidize both domestic 
production and imports. This contrasts with Dixit’s  results, which call for a 
subsidy on domestic production but a tariff on imports. 
In order to understand why the sign of the import policy differs between our 
model and Dixit’s, consider the derivative of welfare with no labor rents at t 
and s equal to zero: Table 1.4  Policy Results-No  Labor Rent 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Jointly optimal policies 
Subsidy  528 
Tariff  -  245 
V  5,369 
W  3,606 
Q,  9,339,751 
Q*  1,734,165 
Welfare"  563.279 
Optimal tariflonly 
Subsidy  0 
Tariff  -  102 
V  5,951 
W  3,7 69 
Q,  8,290,636 
Q2  1,730,508 
Welfare"  562.982 
Optimal subsidy only 
Subsidy  49 1 
Tariff  100 
V  5,410 
W  4,000 
Q,  9,34733  1 
Q,  1,432,016 
Welfare'  563.225 
Status quo 
Subsidy  0 
Tariff  100 
V  5,951 
W  4,000 
Q,  8,341,000 
Q2  1,546,000 
Welfare?  562.963 
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'Welfare reported in billion dollars TPble 1.5  Policy Results-With  Labor Rent 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
Jointly optimal policies 
Subsidy  1,426 
Tariff  -242 
V  4,379 
W  3,609 
Q,  11,904,968 
Q2  1,468,333 
Welfare'  573.809 
Optimal tariponly 
Subsidy  0 
Tariff  180 
V  5,951 
W  4,091 
Q,  8,359,537 
Q2  1,481,012 
Welfare'  57 1.307 
Optimal subsidy only 
Subsidy  1,401 
Tariff  100 
V  4.407 
W  4,000 
Q,  1 1.9 13,770 
1.21 1,527  Q2 
Welfare'  573.764 
Status quo 
Subsidy  0 
Tariff  100 
V  5,951 
W  4,000 
Q,  8,341,000 
Q2  1,546,000 
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Note that at this point there are only two terms in this expression. The first 
term is positive in both models, since marginal utility equals price, which ex- 
ceeds costs, and since a tariff raises domestic production in both models, which 
implies that dxldt is positive. In Dixit’s model, however, dwldt is less than unity, 
while it exceeds unity in ours. Hence the second term,  -my(dwldt  - l), is 
positive in Dixit’s model but negative in ours. As the welfare function is well 
behaved this leads to the optimal tariff being positive in his model. In ours, the 
second term outweighs the first at s = t = 0, so that a subsidy on imports 
improves welfare. 
Intuitively, trade policy  seems to play two roles here. The first is a profit- 
shifting role in correcting any “strategic distortion” 2 la Eaton and Grossman 
(1986). Second, since trade policy affects domestic consumption, it also af- 
fects the  size of consumer surplus. Our model  implies  that  the behavior  of 
firms is fairly competitive.  This by  itself  should work  toward  reversing  the 
sign of the optimal trade policy, since the direction of the profit-shifting policy 
depends on the degree of competition. In addition, our CES demand parametri- 
zation  implies  that  consumer surplus  is quite important,  since demand  re- 
sembles a hyperbola.  This in turn  strengthens the reasons to subsidize both 
domestic and foreign output. Hence, we believe that the calibration results for 
implied conduct together with the effect of the demand parametrization itself 
on the importance of consumer surplus in welfare is responsible for the differ- 
ences between our results and Dixit’s. 
Next compare the jointly optimal subsidy when there are no labor rents to 
the case with labor rents. The optimal policy with rents involves a higher sub- 
sidy on production  than without. This is to be expected, as the presence  of 
rents makes domestic production more desirable. Also notice that the optimal 
tariff changes only very slightly. This suggests a targeting interpretation. The 
presence  of  labor rents distorts production,  as firms produce  too little, both 
because they have monopoly power and because they do not take labor rents 
into account in their production decisions. Hence the optimal policy to correct 
this distortion  is a domestic production  subsidy, which targets the domestic 
distortion directly, rather than a trade policy, which targets the distortion only 
indirectly. 
When the production  subsidy is unavailable, the optimal tariff in the pres- 
ence of labor rents is positive for all years, as opposed to the import subsidy 
typically optimal in the absence of labor rents. Again this is expected, as the 
tariff  must partly do the job of  the unavailable production  subsidy, and the 
higher tariff encourages domestic production. The presence of labor rents thus 
dramatically changes the nature of the optimal policies. 
Next compare the jointly optimal tariffs with and without labor rents to the 29  The Nonoptimality of  Optimal lrade Policies 
optimal tariffs when a production subsidy is unavailable. The tariff is always 
larger (less negative) in the latter case. Again, this has a targeting interpreta- 
tion. When a subsidy is unavailable, the tariff targets the monopoly distortion 
which is really best targeted by the subsidy. Similarly, comparing the jointly 
optimal subsidy and the optimal subsidy when the tariff is set to the MFN level 
shows that the subsidy is slightly lower when applied by itself. When the tariff 
is not available, reducing the subsidy on production acts to encourage imports. 
In the above comparisons, we see at work the general principle of targeting 
instruments to the relevant distortion. We also see that in the absence of  an 
instrument, the optimal level of the remaining instrument is set to help reduce 
other distortions. Dixit offers similar interpretations. 
A natural question to ask next is how valuable such policy is in raising wel- 
fare. The welfare levels with both t and s set optimally, with only t set opti- 
mally, and with only s  set optimally are also given in tables 1.4 and 1.5. Here 
our results are in line with Dixit’s-the  gains to be had are very limited, with 
most of  the benefit  coming from the production  subsidy rather than  from a 
tariff on imports. 
In the absence of labor rents, gains range from a high of about $5 billion in 
1985 to less than $80 million in  1980.16 Welfare gains are larger when labor 
rents constitute a share of the domestic wage bill, since the increased domestic 
production that results from optimal policies adds to consumer surplus and to 
workers’ rents, both of which the price-setting firm  ignores. With our assump- 
tion of  labor costs as 20 percent of unit cost (half of the wage bill), welfare 
gains from jointly optimal policies range from $13 billion  in  1985 to $1.7 
billion  in  1980. The presence of  labor rents thus provides  greater scope for 
strategic trade policy (see, e.g., Katz and Summers 1989). And yet these gains 
remain fairly minor relative to the size of the markets involved. 
Moreover, it may be worse to implement the wrong policy than to do noth- 
ing. For example, if the optimal policies that result from Dixit’s model are used 
instead of the ones identified as optimal by our model, welfare is slightly lower 
in some years. Table  1.6 compares the status quo (MFN tariff, no subsidy) 
welfare level (WMFN)  with the welfare which results from application of the 
optimal policies suggested by our CES model (WcEs)  and the welfare which 
results from Dixit’s optimal policies (  Wn).  Implementing Dixit’s policies re- 
duces welfare in the absence of labor rents in 1981, 1982, and 1983 but raises 
welfare over inaction in the remaining years. With labor rents, Dixit’s policies 
reduce welfare in  1985 but increase it in other years. Of course, the lack of 
responsiveness in welfare also implies that the loss from following the wrong 
policies is likely to be small-a  conclusion borne out for 1981-83.  In  1985, 
16. Potential gains in  1985 are particularly large because firm behavior in that year is not very 
competitive. This increases the welfare gains available from increasing output with a production 
subsidy. 30  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
Table 1.6  Comparison of Models 
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  I984  I985 
CES model 
Subsidy  528 
Tariff  -  245 
Dixitk linear model 
Subsidy  611 
Tariff  408 
Welfare. 
WES  563.28 
WD  563.09 
WMFN  562.96 
CES model 
Subsidy  1,426 
Tariff  -  242 
Dixit’s linear model 
Subsidy  1,712 
Tariff  357 
Welfare. 
WE$  573.81 
WD  573.46 
WMFN  571.30 
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No Labor Rent 
405  298 
-268  -318 
408  258 
440  52 1 
507.62  484.83 
507.42  484.57 
507.48  484.73 
With Labor Rent 
1,590  1,557 
-263  -311 
1,768  1,643 
389  46 1 
517.31  493.96 
517.09  493.74 
515.38  492.37 
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however, application of the optimal tariff and subsidy which result from Dixit’s 
model entails a decline in welfare of nearly $60 billion in the presence of labor 
rents. Misguided policy decisions can indeed prove costly in certain cases. 
As shown by Krishna (1989), however, quantitative restraints such as VERs 
differ fundamentally  from tariffs in that they facilitate collusive behavior by 
the competing firms. The existence of VERs starting in 1981 thus affects firm 
behavior, as reflected in the CVs y and y*. The rise in y* corresponding to the 
imposition of VERs in  1981, and in y after  1983, supports this theory. Our 
simulation results for these years, however, take y and y* as fixed behavioral 
parameters.  These CVs are surely inappropriate  for calculating  the optimal 
tariff and subsidies, since these policies do not have the collusion-increasing 
effects of VERs. 
As an attempt to correct for this problem of static CVs, we double the y and 
y* that result from the calibration for 1983 before finding the optimal subsidy 
and tariff. This experiment,  which makes y and y* more negative,  thus im- 
poses the more competitive conjectures Krishna (1989) tells us should exist in 
the absence of a VER. Of course, we have no way  of knowing  whether our 
modification is sufficient (or too much); we mean this only as a first step. 
Table 1.7 compares the prices, policies, and welfare which result from the 31  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
Table 1.7  Effect of Voluntary Export Restraints 
MFN Tariff  Jointly Optimal 
Tariff 
Actual  Modified  Rate  Actual  Modified 





































No Labor Rent 
-27.770  -27.770 
-8.710  -8.710 
7,249  7,250 
4,93  1  5,170 
0  0 
100  318 
7,249,339  7,303,303 
2,304,043  2,111,708 
641.189  641.117 
Labor Rent = $1400 
-27.770  -27.770 
-8.710  -8.710 
7,249  7,250 
4,93  1  5,170 
0  0 
100  318 
7,249,339  7,303,303 
2,304,043  2,111,708 
651.338  65 1.342 
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modified CVs for 1983 with those from the original CVs, both at the actual 
MFN tariff and at the jointly optimal policy. The first two columns compare 
the actual MFN tariff results with the results of the modified CFs. Without the 
VER, both domestic and foreign prices would be lower, and consumption of 
both countries' cars higher. Welfare rises by about $700 million or $1.1 billion, 
depending on whether labor rents exist. This experiment thus highlights the 
point that a tariff is (from the standpoint of efficiency) a far better instrument 
with  which to protect domestic industries than  a quantitative  restraint.  The 
third column shows the quota-equivalent  tariff rate, that is, the tariff (to the 
nearest dollar) required to duplicate the original level of Japanese imports as- 
suming the less collusive conjectures. Notice that for the same volume of im- 
ports, US.  production is substantially larger with a tariff than with a VER. 
The next two columns compare the jointly optimal subsidy and tariff out- 
comes with the results of  modifying the CVs. The more competitive behavior 
on the part of firms lessens the size of the oligopoly distortions, so that both 
domestic and import subsidies decline. U.S. producers thus lose some market 
share to Japanese firms, but the increased consumer surplus results in a slight 
gain in welfare. 32  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
1.3.4  Sensitivity Analysis 
We next consider how sensitive our results are to the calibration parameters 
we obtain from outside sources. In the interest of brevity, we present sensitivity 
results only for 1979; similar results obtain for the other years. 
Table  1.8 shows the effect  of changing  U.S.  and Japanese costs over the 
same range considered by  Dixit. This affects firms'  behavioral parameters y 
and y*  and the resulting optimal policies and welfare. Notice that the estimate 
of y (7") becomes more negative  as costs in the United States (Japan) rise, 
since a smaller markup of price over marginal cost indicates more competitive 
behavior. Similarly, y and y* rise to reflect more collusive behavior as costs 
decline, though both remain negative for the range of plausible costs. 
As Japanese costs rise, the optimal subsidy falls slightly, while the optimal 
tariff rises markedly, though it remains negative. Similarly, as U.S. costs rise, 
the optimal subsidy falls, while the optimal tariff remains relatively constant. 
This further reinforces the targeting interpretation given before. As Japanese 
firms' costs rise, their implied behavior becomes more competitive, thereby 
reducing the desirability of subsidizing imports. Similarly, as U.S. costs rise, 
implied U.S. firm behavior becomes more competitive, reducing the size of the 
domestic distortion targeted by the subsidy. 
Welfare at the optimum falls when US.  costs rise, since the resource costs 
of  production  enter the welfare function directly. Welfare is relatively  unaf- 
fected by  Japanese  costs,  since these enter only via their  impact on prices. 
Again, however, welfare falls, as higher costs mean higher prices. 
Table 1.8  Cost Sensitivity: 1979 (labor rent = 0) 
U.S. cost 
Japan Cost 
3,000  3,400  3,600 








































-  245 
563.279 
-  15.724 
-5.272 
361 
-  246 
561.451 
-5.027 





-  10.606 
516 
-  152 
563.250 
-  15.724 
-  10.606 
348 
-  152 
56  1.422 
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Table 1.9 shows the sensitivity of our results to the assumed values for the 
elasticity of demand for auto services, E, and the elasticity of substitution be- 
tween U.S. and Japanese autos, u. While the choice of  E  significantly alters 
the resulting optimal welfare level, the behavioral parameters and the optimal 
subsidy and tariff levels change only slightly for reasonable values of u and E. 
Furthermore,  as E rises, E~'(x,x)  and  &'I(  y,y) become negative,  which implies 
that autos are complements in demand. Our parametrization thus puts an upper 
bound of  about  1.3 on the total  elasticity of demand.  As u rises,  U.S.  and 
Japanese cars become more similar to consumers, so that firms' implied behav- 
ior becomes more collusive. The optimal subsidy rises along with the tariff, 
which becomes less negative. 
Table  1.10 shows the  sensitivity  analysis of the elasticity of  substitution 
among Japanese autos, u) .  As u, increases, ax  rises only slightly, and CT) always 
remains larger. American cars are thus quite differentiated from one another, 
Table 1.9  Sensitivity to Elasticity of Demand and Elasticity of Substitution: 
1979 (labor rent = 0) 
Elasticity of 
Demand (E) 
Elasticity of Substitution (0) 
1.5  2.0  3.0 
1.1 
1.3 
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Table 1.10  Sensitivity to Elasticity of Substitution among Japanese Automobiles 
(uJ: 1979 
0, 
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as opposed to Japanese cars, which are far more substitutable in demand. As 
cry becomes large, Japanese cars become closer substitutes, and y* becomes 
very large, implying substantial collusion between Japanese firms. Without dif- 
ferentiation between Japanese cars, any markup of price above cost is evidence 
of monopoly power. A small cry,  on the other hand, results in implausible nega- 
tive values for E”(x,x) and &u( y,y). We thus find a lower bound on cry of about 
2.0. Again, however, the choice of cry does not at all affect prices, which satisfy 
(3) and (4), or the resulting optimal policies and welfare. An econometrically 
derived estimate for cry would thus allow a more definitive determination of 
Japanese firms’ behavior but would not otherwise affect our results. 
These sensitivity analyses imply that the calibration results and the optimal 
policies are quite insensitive to changes in the parameter values, with the ex- 
ception of costs. Marginal costs, however, are the least reliable of our data. To 
ensure that our crucial result of firm behavior more competitive than Bertrand 
is not merely an artifact of poor data, we calculate the costs which would be 
necessary  for firms to act as if  they were Bertrand  and Cournot duopolists. 
These were presented at the bottom of table 1.3. 
For U.S. firms, notice that even the higher Bertrand-equivalent costs are far 
smaller than our data for actual costs. Costs for Japanese firms, on the other 
hand, are much closer to the Bertrand costs. As with prices, the Bertrand and 
Cournot costs are fairly close together. While this further illustrates the more 
collusive behavior of Japanese firms, both U.S.  and Japanese firms still appear 
to behave fairly competitively. 
In general, the sensitivity analyses highlight our point that what is most im- 
portant is not the parameter values, but rather the specification of  the model 
itself. 35  The Nonoptimality of Optimal Trade Policies 
1.4  Conclusion 
Our results indicate that simple calibration models of trade in oligopolistic 
industries are quite sensitive to the model structure imposed. Though we have 
taken one step in elaborating Dixit’s model, further extensions seem worth- 
while. 
As noted previously, further disaggregation such as between large cars and 
small cars would more accurately  reflect industry conditions. Whether this 
would give strikingly different results, however, is uncertain. What is clear is 
that the resulting model would be extremely complex; our model is already 
highly nonlinear. Further differentiation would require a substantial amount of 
additional data, perhaps broken down even by each particular model. Much 
of this, such as market-share data, is publicly  available; other data, particu- 
larly costs and elasticities of substitution, would no doubt prove more elusive. 
Feenstra and Levinsohn (1989) provide an excellent beginning. 
Less difficult to implement  would be the inclusion of quality effects, an 
extension on which we are currently at work. Indeed, many studies examine 
the effects of trade policy on quality upgrading; Feenstra (1988) focuses on the 
Japanese auto industry. In unpublished work, we show that Dixit’s calibration 
procedure cancels out quality effects, so that quality upgrading plays no role in 
the determination of optimal policies in his model.” This clearly unsatisfactory 
result stems primarily from Dixit’s linear demand structure and is, we hope, 
not a general feature of calibration models. 
One result common to both our model and Dixit’s is that the presence of 
labor rents substantially enlarges the potential benefits of optimal trade poli- 
cies. This is particularly important since wages in import-competing industries 
such as steel and autos probably include a large rent component. Following 
Dixit, we include only the most rudimentary attempt at capturing the effects 
of these rents. Endogenizing the wage process through inclusion of  a formal 
model of union-firm bargaining (cooperative or not) would no doubt provide 
great insight. Eaton (1988) provides several suggestions for fruitful research, 
and work on this is under way. 
Our results similarly accord with Dixit’s in that we find a surprising amount 
of “targeting” of instruments to particular distortions. Only limited theoretical 
work exists on targeting rules for oligopolistic industries analogous to targeting 
rules for distortions in competitive industries. Krishna and Thursby (1991) pro- 
vide a beginning, but there remains more work to be done. 
We make only a limited attempt to take into account the effects of preex- 
isting quantitative restraints on firms’ behavioral conjectures. A more satisfac- 
tory way  to measure firm interactions is clearly necessary. Recent work on 
dynamic  differential  games, such as Driskill  and  McCafferty  (1989),  may 
prove useful here. 
17. The proof, which will appear in future work, is available from the authors. 36  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swagel 
For the present, however, our results suggest that the policy recommenda- 
tions of  simple calibrated trade exercises should be interpreted with extreme 
caution. Moreover,  as the gains from activist policy  appear quite small, the 
case for activist policy is far from clear. However, such exercises provide valu- 
able insights into the behavior of firms over time and the effects of policies on 
this behavior. They also provide good estimates of demand elasticities. But our 
understanding of calibrated trade models is far from perfect, and more work is 
clearly necessary. Until our ability to apply theory to actual industry conditions 
improves, it remains vital not to oversell such models to policymakers. 
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Comment  Garth Saloner 
Krishna, Hogan, and Swagel’s (KHS) purpose is to demonstrate the sensitivity 
of calibration models of trade to the assumptions that are made about the nature 
of imperfect competition. They succeed in this goal and reach the appropriate 
conclusion that “until our ability to apply theory to actual industry conditions 
improves, it remains vital not to oversell such models to policymakers.” 
In order to interpret the results in this class of models, it is useful to lay out 
the essence of the basic approach. The basic structure of the conjectural varia- 
tions models and the calibration procedure is transparent in the case of homo- 
geneous-goods Cournot duopoly. In that case a typical firm, say firm 1, maxi- 
mizes its profits given by 
TI  =  P(q, + q2)ql -  C,(q,), 
where q, is the output of firm i, P(.)  is the industry inverse demand curve, and 
C,(.)  is firm i’s cost function. Maximizing  IT^  with respect to ql yields: 
Calling the part of Equation (1) in braces y (i.e., dq,/dq, =  y) and rearrang- 
ing yields: 
P -  C‘ -  s,(l + 7) 
P  & 
where (P -  C’)/P  is the price-cost margin (PCM), E = -(dQ/dP)P/Q is the 
industry elasticity of  demand, and s,  is firm 1’s market share. 
Garth Saloner is professor of  economics and management at the Massachusetts Institute of 
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The calibration models begin  with equations like (2) and, by making as- 
sumptions about E,  si, and the PCM, calculate y. The now discredited conjec- 
tural variations models (see Tirole [1988] for a discussion) interpret the term 
in parentheses in equation (l), and hence y, as a behavioral change in firm 2’s 
action in response to a change in firm 1’s action. In a static game the notion of 
a behavioral response by  one firm to another is meaningless and so afortiori 
is the term dq,/dq, in equation (1). 
Taking equation (2)  as the starting point, however, y does have a meaningful 
interpretation. If the Cournot duopoly model applies, then the PCM is equal to 
the inverse of the elasticity, i.e., y is equal to 0 in equation (2). (To see this, 
simply note that firm 1’s first-order condition under Cournot is that given by 
equation (1) with the third, “nonsense”, term omitted). If y exceeds 0, then 
the appropriate interpretation is simply that the PCM is higher than would be 
expected from Coumot duopolists facing an elasticity of c.  Thus y is a mean- 
ingful measure of the degree to which the firms are able to elevate the PCM 
above “the competitive level” defined in terms of the Cournot equilibrium. 
But what is the appropriate inference to make if one finds, as indeed Dixit 
does, that y  is negative? Then the PCM is lower, and hence competition  is 
fiercer, than in the Cournot model. Since models in which price is the strategic 
variable  can yield  much  lower PCMs, a natural alternative  is to consider a 
differentiated products model of that kind. 
This is the approach that KHS adopt. In their formulation, the crucial equa- 
tion which is the equivalent of equation (2) above is their equation (3) which 
can be abbreviated as 
(3) 
where E” represents firm i’s own price elasticity. 
The interpretation here is similar to that above. If  the firms are competing 
as static price competition suggests they should, the PCM is again equal to the 
inverse of the elasticity so that y = 0. If  the firms are competing less aggres- 
sively than that, the PCM should exceed the inverse of the elasticity so that, in 
order for equation (3) to hold, y must be positive. 
An advantage of this formulation is that it accommodates very competitive 
outcomes, rather than bounding them from below by the Cournot outcome. If 
there is a great deal of competition the own-price elasticity will be high and 
the PCM’s will be very low. For example, if the firms face constant marginal 
costs and compete in prices, the Bertrand result with price equal to marginal 
cost (and infinitely large own-price elasticity) obtains. Thus in this formulation 
it should be extremely surprising to encounter negative values of y. 
As KHS’s table 1.3 shows, however, not only does y turn out to be uniformly 
negative in their calibrations, but y is less than  -9  in five of the seven years, 
and in  1982 it is -26.91.  Referring to equation (3), there are three possible 
explanations for such a finding: (a) the calibration is plausible and behavior “is 39  The Nonoptirnality of Optimal Trade Policies 
more competitive than Bertrand,” (b) E has been mismeasured and is actually 
greater than the calibration suggests, or (c) the PCM has been mismeasured 
and is actually lower than the calibration suggests. 
Taking (a) first, Might competition actually be more competitive than Ber- 
trand? The “fundamental theorem of industrial organization” asserts that with 
a sufficiently rich assumption space, modem 1.0. can explain any observation! 
A number of “solutions” readily suggest themselves: (i) the firms are involved 
in an implicitly collusive supergame and what is being measured is a punish- 
ment phase during which firms are using severe punishments of the kind advo- 
cated by Abreu (1986), (ii) as in Froot and Klemperer (1989) firms are “buying 
market share” which will earn them high profits in the future, (iii) the incum- 
bent  firms are deterring  potential  entrants by  signaling low costs as in the 
Milgrom-Roberts (1982) limit-pricing model, (iv) some of the incumbents are 
attempting to drive out others through predatory pricing, or (v) firms are selling 
automobiles as a way of later selling automobile parts, and hence the “price” 
variable understates the value of a sale. 
None of these explanations is particularly plausible. First, several of them 
are really explanations for short-term pricing behavior, whereas the authors 
find that y is negative for seven years in  a row.  Second, KHS  calculate the 
automobile price that would be predicted by their model if the firms were sim- 
ply behaving as static price competition suggests they should and were not 
taking into account the kinds  of  considerations listed in the previous para- 
graph. The predicted price for a U.S. automobile is of the order of $25,000! If 
that is correct, the automobile manufacturers are paying a great deal in short- 
term forgone profits to deter entry, build market share, drive out or punish 
rivals, or sell auto parts! 
This suggests that either E  or the PCM or both are mismeasured. The esti- 
mate of  E  is around 1.25. Studies which examine the own-price elasticities of 
particular automobile models tend to find elasticities in the range 5-16  (see 
Adams and Brock 1982). One troubling feature of the way in which E” is mea- 
sured by  KHS is the way in which it is derived from the degree of substitut- 
ability between  goods of  two producers  of  Japanese cars, uy,  and the cor- 
responding  measure  for substitutability  between  goods  produced  by  U.S. 
producers, 0;. 
The procedure they use is as follows: Their equations (1) and (2) specify the 
demands for U.S. and Japanese cars, Q, and Q2,  respectively, as functions of 
inter alia u, and uy,  i.e., Q, =f(ux,uv,  . . .) and Q2  =f(ux,uy,  . . .). In the cali- 
bration uv  is set by the authors and ux  is then derived using the assumed func- 
tional forb  of the demand functions and the observed sales of U.S. and Japa- 
nese  cars.  This  procedure  places  a  large  burden  on  the  functional-form 
assumptions on demand to yield information on the value of underlying taste 
parameters. That is, the degree of substitutability between cars produced by 
two U.S. firms, a “marginal” concept, is inferred from the ratio of actual sales 
of U.S. and Japanese cars each year, an “average” measure. 40  Kala Krishna, Kathleen Hogan, and Phillip Swage1 
Nonetheless, it is unlikely that mismeasurement in E alone is enough to ex- 
plain  the observed 7’s. In 1982 the PCM is about 1/33, so that for y to be 
nonnegative,  E” would have to be 33, which seems implausibly large. 
Thus the measured PCMs must probably  share in the blame:  they are too 
low to be consistent with “reasonable” elasticity estimates. One possible rea- 
son why the measured PCMs may be too low is the difficulty of measuring 
marginal costs correctly. For example, the PCMs compiled by the Census Bu- 
reau use a measure of  “payroll and materials.” Yet  many of the payroll costs 
represent the fixed costs of the minimum number of workers required to oper- 
ate the assembly  line and the hoards of  paper shufflers who contribute to a 
fixed overhead rather than to marginal costs. 
In the  end, however, for the conclusion  that the authors reach, it doesn’t 
matter  whether it is E  or the PCM that is mismeasured.  If, as seems likely, 
there is significant mismeasurement in one or the other or both, then as KHS 
conclude, it is premature to use models of this kind for policy analysis. 
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